Forging Convention
Phoenix, Arizona
30 April 1979

Good morning, fellow forgers. It may not have occured to you but I have a forging department too. You deal in metal forging, I deal in paper forgery. We have lots in common. I have had the privilege of being associated with our nation's intelligence activities now for just a little over two years. I have learned a lot, it has been exciting, new things like forging and other activities, but what has really impressed me perhaps most in these two years has been the degree, the rate of change that is taking place in the intelligence activities of our country. The change is fundamental, far reaching and I believe, already, beneficial. It isn't change that we just thought up and instituted, it is change that has really been forced upon us by trends in our country. Three of them in particular I would like to mention to you.

First, is an evolving sense or perception of our country's role on the international scene. The second is the changing techniques and sophistication by which we collect intelligence and the third is the increasing interest and concern of the American public in its intelligence activities. Let me, before I respond to your questions, which I am most looking forward to this morning, discuss very briefly with you these three trends and what they mean for us in the world of intelligence. Let me start with our changing perception of our role in the world.

I believe the United States is in a state of transition in its public attitude toward the responsibilities of our country in the rest of the world. We are moving from an activist interventionist mode to one in which

the limits, the realities of our ability to influence events in other countries is more widely recognized and appreciated. This is not to say that we are retrenching into an isolationism. In fact I happen to believe that we are now emerging from our post-Vietnam aversion to any kind of intervention on the international scene into a much more realistic appraisal of our position in the world. We cannot forsake the United States' major responsibilities to the free world. Yet, the circumstances today are such that we must guage much more carefully, than ever before, I believe what that role that we play in the world should be and can be. Look for instance at the difficulty we have today in deciding whom we are for and whom we are against. Traditionally, we generally have been against those people the Soviets were for, and yet if you look just at 1978 there are some examples of very difficult choices we had in deciding whom to be for and whom to be against. There were at least two instances in which communist countries were fighting with communist countries. Once it was Somalia and Ethiopia. The Soviets were backing Ethiopia. Should we have have supported Somalia, the aggressor in that war and a country governed by a communist dictator? Later in the year it was Vietnam and Cambodia. The Soviets were backing Vietnam. Should we have supported the Cambodian regime of Pol Pot, perhaps the most repressive regime on the face of the globe since Hitler? And beyond that, today I think we appreciate that it may not always be necessary for the United States to take sides in international issues even if the Soviets are pressing for advantage in some circumstances. The consequences of a nation's succumbing to communist influence are not considered today to be as irreversible as they once were. We have seen cases, Indonesia, Egypt, Somalia and others where the countries were once under communist influence but have returned to independence.

So today there is a legitimate question in our body politic as to whether it is always necessary to come to the rescue of a country being subjected to communist pressures. Even when we do decide that some struggling nation does deserve our support, there are problems today in providing that support that did not exist even a few years ago. One of these stems from the revolution in international communications. Today any international action upon our part is almost instantly transmitted around the globe. Instantly judged, instantly criticized, or given approbation. And today, that kind of international judgment on our actions does influence and inhibit even major countries like the United States and the Soviet Union even though those countries doing the criticism or the approbation are very frequently second or third level powers.

There are other difficulties today which we did not face twenty or twenty-five years ago, if we do attempt to sway other countries through diplomacy or international organizations. In the past, most nations of the free world took their cue from us in international political events. Today in such fora as the United Nations even the smallest country exercises its one vote independently of what the major powers may desire and in fact the major powers very frequently find themselves together on the minority side of the votes. If then we become frustrated with diplomacy and decide to intervene militarily, the memory of Vietnam reminds us that when the pendulum of offense and defense in military weaponry tends toward the defense as I believe it does today, even a minor military power can give a major one a difficult time. Now

what all this adds up to is not that we are impotent upon the world scene but the leverage of our influence while it is considerable, must be exercised more subtly if it is to be effective. We must be more concerned with long term influences rather than just putting fingers in the dike. We must be able to anticipate rather than just react to events. We must be able to understand the underlying influences and forces which can be influenced and driven over time. For us in the intelligence world this means a vast expansion of our scope of interest and activities.

Thirty years ago our primary concern in American intelligence was to keep track of Soviet military activities. Today the threat to our well-being comes not only from the Soviet Union and not only in military form. The subject matter with which we do deal in intelligence certainly must have a large military content. But today it has broadened. It includes politics, economics, terrorism, narcotics, energy, food, population, the health and psychiatry of world leaders, to mention just a few. There is hardly an academic discipline, there is hardly an area of the world in which we can afford not to be informed if we are going to keep track of the things that this country must keep track of to execute its foreign policy properly. Hence, this is a very demanding time for intelligence, a time of fundamental change and expansion in our outlook and our undertakings.

The second trend which I mentioned to you is that of the technological revolution in collecting intelligence information. Basically there are three ways in which we collect intelligence. The first is

photographic: pictures from satellites, pictures from airplanes. The second, is signals intelligence: intercepting signals that are passing through the air like right in this room today. Sometimes signals from military equipment, sometimes signals from communications equipment. Finally, there is the traditional human agent, the spy. The first two of these, photographic and signals, we call technical intelligence as opposed to the human. Our capabilities in this area, thanks to the great sophisitcation of American industry are truly burgeoning today. We have more information coming in than we can imagine and the problem we have is just handling it, processing it, and being able to utilize it properly. Interestingly though, rather than denigrating the role of the human intelligence agent this increase of effort in the sophisticated technical area, in fact, makes the human agent even more important. Why? Because generally speaking what the sophisticated technical systems tell you is what happened sometime in the past. Often that raises more questions than it answers. People want to know why did it happen? What is going to happen next? Here, of course, is the forte of the human intelligence agent. Trying to find out what other countries are thinking and planning; what their intentions are for the future. So we need even more emphasis in this area than we have had in the past particularly if we are going to, as I suggested earlier, find it necessary to do more in anticipating future trends in the world. The challenge that we face is how to pull all of this together. How to orchestrate the photographic, the signals and the human intelligence activities so that they complement each other, so that we can obtain the information which our policy makers need, at least risk and least expense.

What questions the photograph cannot answer, you try to solve with the signal or a human intelligence activity. For instance, if you have a photograph here of a new industrial facility in some country, if you don't know what it makes you then target a spy to try to find out precisely whether that is a nuclear weapons manufacturing establishment. Or if a spy overhears a conversation but only gets a glimmer of what is going on, you take that clue and then you search your signals or your photographic files and you try to see if you can piece together the other missing parts of that puzzle. Now this may sound very logical and very simple to you, but it isn't in a large bureaucracy such as constitutes our intelligence community. Our intelligence is spread over many departments and agencies, each with their independent concerns and priorities. The Director of Central Intelligence, since the establishment of the National Security Act of 1947, has been empowered to coordinate all these intelligence activities wherever they are located. Unfortunately he has not had adequate authority to do so, at least until about a year and a quarter ago when President Carter signed a new Executive Order. This order gave me enhanced authorities over the budgets and over the collection activities of all of our national intelligence undertakings. This is a change of fundamental importance in the way we go about our business in intelligence today. The change is still evolving but it is coming along well and it is making a substantial difference in the effectiveness of our intelligence organizations.

The third trend which I mentioned to you was the increased interest and concern of the American public in what we are doing. This of

course derives from the numerous investigations of past intelligence activities; investigations that were conducted in the period 1974 to 1976. These investigations brought to American intelligence more public scrutiny than had perhaps ever before been given to any major intelligence activity in the world. The impact of all this added visibility has been very substantial. It has, in fact, had a traumatic effect within the intelligence community.

Now the right kind of visibility can be beneficial both to us and to the American public. By the right kind I mean disclosure of information which gives the public a better understanding, at least in general terms, of what we are doing and why we are doing it and a sense of assurance that the controls over our intelligence activities are being properly exercised. To achieve this, we are today trying to be more open. We are for instance passing on more of what we produce through regular publication of our analytic work. We are, for instance, answering questions of the press more; we are speaking in public more as I am privileged to do with you today. We are attending symposia and academic conferences more. I know that our intelligence community is doing an honorable and a vital job for our country and it is doing it well and I personally want you, the American public to be as well-informed about that as is possible.

But as you would suspect some of the visibility we have and are receiving is unwanted because it benefits neither Americans nor our friends and allies. Here I am talking, primarily, about the unauthorized

disclosure of properly classified information. At the least, these disclosures have demoralized an intelligence service which has traditionally and necessarily operated largely in secrecy. But even more important has been the destructive effect that such disclosures can and do have on our ability to do what we are mandated to do by the President and the Congress.

First, no one in a foreign country either an individual or an intelligence service will entrust lives or sensitive intelligence information to us unless they believe that we can, in fact, keep the identity of individuals and sensitive information private. Second, it is almost impossible to carry out a quest for information in a society like that of the Soviet Union if what we do and how we do it is bound to become public information. These revelations, then, do damage our long term ability for this country to know what is going on around it in the world particularly in the closed societies of the world. Because we are such an open society we often do not appreciate how much other nations can take advantage of us if we do not take the precaution of being well informed. Perhaps you recall the great wheat steal of 1972 when the Soviet Union dramatically and without notice entered the world's wheat market in a very major way. That affected you and me and our pocketbook. Other surreptitious moves from closed societies can impact upon us in many other ways. On balance let me say that I believe this new and added visibility to intelligence in our country is a net plus. It is a plus because we need support from the American public. It is a plus because we need to ensure against abuse in the future, and yet there are minuses which we must recognize. There are inhibitions on actions that we can take and risks that we will take.

The issue today before us for decision as a country is how much assurance does our nation need against invasions of privacy on the one hand or against the taking of foreign policy actions which might be considered unethical on the other hand. How do we balance these desires for privacy and propriety with the resulting reduction in our intelligence and covert action capabilities. Our Congress is expected to give expression to this question of balance very soon. It will do so in legislation establishing charters for our intelligence community. This legislation will on the one hand set out the authorities for what we can do, and on the other hand the limits within which we can do it. you may have noticed in the Phoenix paper this morning, on the front page there was a story about how this process of evolving these charters is going. It is typical of the kind of debate in which we are very intensely involved today in trying to find this right balance between controls on the one hand and necessary freedom to take risks and to gain necessary information on the other. I sincerely hope that this legislation establishing charters for our intelligence community, giving us our marching orders, setting the standards that the nation expects from us will be enacted by this Congress. If the charters are written with care and sensitivity to problems like those I have been discussing with you, they can help to resolve some of these difficulties. Over reaction either by tying the hands of the intelligence community or by putting on no restrictions whatsoever would be a grave mistake. On the one hand inviting repetition of abuses of the past, on the other hand emasculating our necessary intelligence activities.

With all these pluses and minuses I have been discussing with you, let me assure you in closing that in my view the intelligence community of our country today is strong and capable. It is undergoing substantial change and that is never an easy or a placid process in a large bureaucracy. But out of the present metamorphosis is emerging an intelligence community in which the legal rights of our citizens and the constraints and the controls on what we do will be balanced with the necessity for gaining information essential to the conduct of foreign policy.

This is not an easy transition. We are not there yet, but we are moving rapidly in the right direction. When we reach our goal we will have constructed a new model of American intelligence, a uniquely American model tailored to the laws and the mores and the standards of our society. As we proceed through the next what I think will be two or three years of establishing this balance of really bringing into effect this new model of American intelligence, we are going to need your support as well informed and thinking members of the American public. That is why I appreciate this opportunity to be with you this morning.

Q&As Phoenix Forging
30 April 1979

Q. What do we as citizens do to allow you that latitude and at the same time keep you under control.

A. It is a very thoughtful question and it is with a constructive approach. What can you, as citizens do to help in establishing this necessary balance between controls, between assurance to you that we are both trying to be effective and on the other hand not invading the privacy of the American citizen or doing other things that the American public would not want us to do. And it is the real conundrum of intelligence in a free society, in a democratic society. I did not mention it, but it is my opinion, that the traditional intelligence organizations in the rest of the free world are also being pushed in this same direction that we are. We are setting the pace for them, we are setting up a new model for them and I think you'll find that others will be following rapidly in our footsteps. What can the public do? I can only ask you to have understanding, patience and yet be interested and probing at the same time. And please remember with all respect to the speaker who follows me and may be here and is from the American media, that you can't believe everything in the media.

Q. Admiral Turner how do you explain the apparent block of the Iranian intelligence versus what happened? A. I wondered if that question would ever arise. That is where we do need understanding and let me suggest to you here, we didn't do as well in Iran as I would like to have done, but we didn't have a massive intelligence failure as the press would like to play it up. Why? Because throughout the build-up

in Iran in 1978, and it started early in that year. We clearly observed disturbances, unhappiness, discontent. There were those who were discontented because they weren't participating in the political process. It was a one-man show. There were those who were discontent because the vast economic build-up was not touching them or touching them enough. There were those who were discontent because the religious tenants in their view were being violated, and so on, throughout the country. There were other centers of unhappiness. And as these built up we did keep our policy makers informed, clearly, that the Shah was in trouble. I take personal responsibility as late as October of that year. I held a conviction that when the time came, the Shah with a strong police force and a large army was going to step in and keep the situation under control. What happened instead was that these individual centers of discontent all coalesced together. We did not predict that they would coalesce under the aegis of a 78 year old expatriat cleric who had been out of the country for 14 years, and they did. By the time the Shah apparently decided he might step in with force it was too late and he opted not to do so. Now, let me say we would have liked to have been able to predict that better but predicting short term political explosions, assassinations, coups, this kind of thing, while is very nice to do is the most difficult part of our task. It is not one that I can guarantee we will do every time. I don't know any other intelligence services, I don't know any newspaper critics who predicted this one either. We will try harder, but don't judge the value of your intelligence community on the basis of short term

predictions like this because there really isn't much you can do as a country if you just get short term notice. The question is really more fundamental here and it goes back five or ten years: were we properly digging into the underlying forces and predicting the overall trends in this and many other countries. This is where, as I indicated in my remarks, we are being challenged to expand ourselves and take more in-depth views of world events.

Q. Is SALT II a good deal for the United States?

A I have been so distorted on this picture already by the media that I have to be very cautious. My job in SALT is to tell the Executive Branch--the President, and the Senate of the United States how well we can keep track of what the Soviets are doing if the agreement is signed and they are obliged to curtail certain activities. I would like to philosophize with you on that for a moment, because it puts me and the intelligence activities of our country in a very difficult position here. Because how we can check on the Soviet compliance is a very sensitive matter. It involves the real heart of our ability to collect information. Once you disgorge that you don't get it again. There is a counter to almost every way of collecting intelligence information, and the more you disclose about your method the easier it is to develop that counter and so the more we talk in public about how we are going to monitor SALT the more certain it is that we won't be able to monitor as well. You in the public understandably want to know the answer to the question, can we check on them properly. Is it a satisfactory treaty. Yet there is no way I can really answer

that question in any specificity in public. And here is the case where we have to rely in this country on our democratic process. There is nothing I will not disclose about how we can monitor the Soviet compliance with SALT to the Senate of the United States and they must be your surrogates in judging as to whether it is adequate to the needs of our country.

Q. In line with that Admiral, what is Senate Bill 2525 and the allied Executive Order and is there anything we can do to help you in regard to that?

A. Well, Senate Bill 2525 is the charter that I have been mentioning. It was a charter proposal tabled by the Senate a year and a half ago and which has been under discussion ever since. And again the story in the morning newspaper was an allegation that the Administration in commenting on this bill 2525, has taken certain positions with regard to the controls that should be exercised over what is known as covert action, and so, yes we appreciate your thought of support here. Again, it is a matter of understanding what balance we need to establish, how much the country as a whole wants to have controls and solid checks, and how much they want to be sure we are able to go out and do what has to be done to collect the kind of information that is very important to our national interests. It is the nub of the problem we have largely been discussing this morning.

Q. Could you comment on Russian forging capabilities as it relates to their military hardware and compare that to our own.

A. I have to be very honest with you, I don't have that at my fingertips in that detail. Clearly, some examples that we have seen where we have obtained our actual Soviet hardware, their forgings, their degree of machining to fineness has not been up to our standards even on sophisticated

military equipment like aircraft. On the other hand, we have found that the Soviets by redundancy, by overpowering in some cases manage to get the performance without the sophistication and the fineness of measurement that we do and they are improving. But the time and I don't have a specific handle on how well their forging industry is coming along.

A. In the event of a SALT agreement, would you say we have adequate means of verification or not?

Q. I really find it very difficult to answer that in a specific way because there are 40 some provisions of the SALT agreement. Each one has a different degree of verifiability. Each one has some degree of risk. There is nothing you can check on for 100% assurance. So, it is a very complex integration of your ability at X percent for this and Y percent for that to give you that sense of confidence. In the long run it actually transcends my full responsibilities and takes that of the Secretary of Defense who can tell you then if there is some possibility they can cheat on provision 72, what can we do about it how well prepared can we be to respond. It takes the Secretary of State who has to say what are the benefits of this treaty in a much broader sense. Are they commensurate with whatever risks there are in it. So, I am going to have to demure on your question I am afraid.

Q. Admiral, with your knowledge is it safe to say that Idi Amin is completely finished or is there some possibility that he might return?

A. Does Idi Amin have 7 lives. He certainly seems to be on the skids right now but I don't think you can ever count somebody like that out completely. There has been a wide recognition it appears to me inside Uganda that he

was a very nefarious individual, however, it is going to take some time now to see whether a new government can really take hold in Uganda or whether it will degenerate back to tribal strife and in that kind of a circumstance you just can't tell what would happen. The country is partly christian; 90% Christian; 10 percent Moslem, a fair amount Arab and fair amount Black, they have very strong tribal ethnic leanings, it is not a cohesive nation and it is going to be very difficult for President Lule who has just taken over to pull all that together and make sure that the country just doesn't fragment.

Q. Admiral, going back to SALT II, given the track record of the Russians what with their surrogate Cubans in Africa, Southeast Asia it doesn't seem that the Russians and we have the same meaning of detente and what makes us think wethat we need this agreement and can trust them. They don't have a good track record now.

A. You are raising a very deep and philosophic problem of what is called linkage. You link the agreement of to release arms on the one hand with Soviet activities in Africa, Southeast Asia, or whatever you may see. It is our observation as far as their track record on arms control is concerned, that they have lived up to the SALT I agreement and whenever we had differences with them as to whether they were or not we were able to resolve those satisfactorily. Whether we should link performance in non-arms control areas to this arms control agreement is a very fundamental foreign policy question. While I'm sorry this appears to be dodging some of your questions this morning, I want to make clear that it is the role of the intelligence community to be sure we are giving objective, unbiased advice to our policy makers and to do that we must carefully disassociate ourselves from policy: from whether we should sign SALT, from whether we should support this country or that country, on whether

we should take this foreign policy or that. Because once I become known as an advocate of this policy or that policy, then people will suspect we are tailoring the intelligence to support that policy. That, of course, is what we cannot afford and the whole reason in 1947 for creating a Central Intelligence Agency as one of the parts of our intelligence community to have one organization that was totally outside the policy framework. Intelligence in State, intelligence in Defense, intelligence in Treasury or other places obviously are in organizations that have policy functions. But we in the Central Intelligence Agency are sort of neuter and we try to stay that way so I can't really address the broader question here, only the smaller one that their track record in arms control has been satisfactory. Whether you want to link that with your decision on SALT with their performance elsewhere is a much broader policy issue.

Q. Would you comment on our position in Rhodesia and South Africa.

A. Our position in Rhodesia and South Africa. Well, we are very concerned with the trend of events of the last 6 months or so in the whole southern part of Africa. What we had hoped was going to be some form of a peaceful electoral solution to two major problems: the problem of what used to be known as Southwest Africa, now known as Namibia, a province down there that has been governed by the Union of South Africa since World War II and the problem of Rhodesia and how to transition from what has been white domination or political control to a black or representative of the population distribution control. The Namibian process has really broken down at this point. We are waiting for continuing negotiations there but they don't look too

good. We have had an election in Rhodesia in recent weeks. There are those who are very concerned that because elements known as the patriotic front who have been urging from outside Rhodesia this integration of the government did not participate in this election. We are very concerned that they will continue the guerilla warfare that has taken place over the last few years in Rhodesia, even against what will now be a black dominated internal government. So our task of the country for the next few weeks or months here is to try to find someway we can avoid this Rhodesian situation degenerating into a extensive civil war which would be to nobody's benefit.

Q. Admiral, the CIA having been under a certain amount of criticism lately, it could be that in President Carter's campaign that you might be a liability and therefore need to go. Would you comment on that?

A. No. I am not a politician, I don't know what their calculations on that will be. I am here to serve the country as long as the country wants me. I didn't seek this job and I am happy to serve in it as long as they need me.

Q. How do you get your instructions as to your involvement in the affairs of a foreign government?

A. We are talking here now, not about intelligence. We are talking about what is known in our trade as covert action. Covert action is the attempt to influence events in foreign countries without the source of that influence being identified. Somebody mentioned Chile. That was a covert action, I might say parenthetically that was not something the CIA did on its own, it was fully authorized by the appropriate elements in government at that time. Since then the government has, through law, established a very clear procedure for giving me directions on whether the Central Intelligence Agency will carry out a covert action.

First, it has to be approved in writing by the President. Secondly, I must then notify up to seven committees of the Cngress about what we are doing. And if you don't think that is inhibiting and controlling--so let me say that we in the CIA do not

Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003000110001-0